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Abstract
Studies of the effects of private equity in the United States 
have shown that the short-term, return-oriented business 
model can put a strain on industrial relations between em-
ployers and employees. This is similarly assumed to be the 
case for the coordinated market economy in Germany. 
Firstly, the article shows for the years 2013 to 2018 the 
volume of employees affected by private equity takeovers 
in Germany and the industries in which these employees 
work. Secondly, it examines whether equal co-determina-
tion, which German law requires of companies with more 
than 2,000 employees, is avoided or ignored by private 
equity companies to a greater extent than by other types 
of employers. Thirdly, the change in the activity of works 
councils whose companies have been taken over by a pri-
vate equity firm is considered. Overall, it is becoming ap-
parent that private equity companies are more restrictive at 
the company level than other types of employer and that it 
is becoming more difficult for works councils to adequately 
represent employees’ interests.
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Resumen
Los estudios sobre los efectos de las empresas de capital 
riesgo o sociedades de inversión en los Estados Unidos 
han demostrado que el modelo de negocio a corto plazo 
y orientado al retorno de la inversión puede ejercer 
presión sobre las relaciones laborales entre 
empleadores y em-pleados. De igual manera, se supone 
que este es el caso de la economía de mercado 
coordinada en Alemania.
En primer lugar, el artículo muestra para los años 
2013 a 2018 el volumen de empleados afectados por 
adquisi-ciones de empresas de capital riesgo o 
sociedades de in-versión en Alemania y las industrias 
en las que trabajan estos empleados. En segundo 
lugar, se examina hasta qué punto la co-determinación 
igualitaria, que la ley ale-mana exige a las empresas con 
más de 2000 empleados, es ignorada o evitada en mayor 
o menor medida por parte de dichas empresas en 
comparación con otras. En tercer lugar, se analiza el 
cambio en la actividad de los comités de empresa de 
aquellos casos que han sido asumidos por una sociedad 
de inversión. En general, se evidencia que las 
sociedades de inversión son más restrictivas a nivel de 
empresa en comparación con otros modelos y que se 
está volviendo más difícil para los comités de empresa 
re-presentar adecuadamente los intereses de los 
empleados.
Palabras Clave
Co-determinación; Financiarización; Relaciones 
laborales; Empresa de capital riesgo; Comité de empresa.
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1. Introduction
The business of private equity is designed to as-
sert the interests of the owners against the other 
stakeholders of a company in a strict manner (Jen-
sen 1993). Accordingly, studies on the effects of 
private equity in the United States have shown that 
the short-term, return-oriented business model can 
burden industrial relations between employers and 
employees (Appelbaum and Batt 2014; Clark 2009). 
This is also suspected to be the case for the coor-
dinated market economies in Europe, where private 
equity was often established before the financial and 
economic crisis in 2008/09 and continues to flourish 
after an interruption (Watt 2008; Gospel, Pendleton 
and Vitols 2014). In Germany, as a coordinated mar-
ket economy with an established system of co-de-
termination, private equity established itself around 
2000 (Jowett and Jowett 2011). However, to date few 
studies have been conducted on the effects of this 
particular type of financialization on the system of co-
determination in Germany (Haves, Vitols and Wilke 
2014; Scheuplein 2019a). 
In Germany, co-determination is well-established 
both at plant level and at company level (Müller-
Jentsch and Weitbrecht 2003: XX). Both levels 
build upon and complement each other. While the 
works councils are responsible for operations at in-
dividual locations, strategic decisions for the entire 
company are made by the supervisory boards. In 
Germany the activity of works councils is closely 
linked to that of employee representatives on su-
pervisory boards; often the representatives are 
concurrently members of both bodies (Waddington 
and Conchon 2016: 83). Therefore, it makes sense 
to examine the influence of private equity simulta-
neously for both levels of co-determination.
However, the two levels of co-determination 
have very different numbers of boards. For exam-
ple, in Germany the number of supervisory boards 
with employee representation on equal terms was 
most recently recorded as being around 630 to 640 
(Ehrenstein 2017). Therefore, for this level of corpo-
rate co-determination a full survey of all companies 
that were in private equity ownership is conducted in 
this article. Here it was examined whether the legal 
form, legal domicile and number of employees were 
used by employers to exclude employees from par-
ticipation. In contrast, there are about 28,000 estab-
lished works councils.  As their influence varies ac-
cording to industry and company size (Ellguth and 
Kohaut 2019), this discussion only aims to provide 
an empirical overview for one industry. Members of 
the works councils in this industry were asked about 
their assessments of the influence of private equity 
on the company and on the daily activities of the 
works councils. The largest industrial sector in Ger-
many, the automotive industry, where there is a high 
number of works councils in the companies, was 
selected for the investigation. All in all 36 interviews 
were conducted with works councils from the auto-
motive supply industry.
Overall, it is becoming apparent that private equity 
companies at the company level are more restrictive 
than other types of employers in terms of employee 
participation opportunities and that it is becoming 
more difficult for works councils to adequately repre-
sent employees’ interests. 
This mix of methods was chosen because of the 
different number of cases of the two levels of co-
determination. It provides an initial overview of the 
simultaneous influence of financial investors on co-
determination in Germany, and should also stimulate 
the need for further quantitative and qualitative re-
search on this phenomenon.
The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-
lows. First, the business model of private equity is 
presented and a theoretical understanding of pri-
vate equity as a form of financialization is devel-
oped (2.). Then the state of research on the impact 
on industrial relations is discussed (3.) and the ex-
tent to which takeovers affect employees in Germa-
ny is shown. A sample of private equity investments 
in Germany between 2013 and 2018 is analyzed 
(4.). Next, the extent to which companies with more 
than 2,000 employees demonstrate parity co-deter-
mination is examined (5.). Finally, a survey of works 
councils in the automotive supply industry is used 
to examine the change in works council work (6.). 
The article concludes with a summary and conclu-
sions for further work (7.).
2. Private equity as a form of 
financialization
Over the past three decades, new types of play-
ers such as private equity, hedge funds and real 
estate funds have emerged on the international 
investment landscape, investing the capital they 
manage in mostly non-regulated capital markets 
(Gospel, Pendleton and Vitols 2014). The specific 
investment field for private equity companies is 
the market for corporate control, where they ac-
quire companies with the goal of a profitable re-
sale (Talmor and Vasvari 2011; Cumming 2012). 
The dominant financial criterion distinguishes the 
business model from strategic investors, who oc-
casionally acquire companies but within industries 
or technology fields in which they operate perma-
nently. In most cases, private equity companies 
acquire substantial ownership interests because 
they want to intervene in the strategic decisions 
of the company. This entrepreneurial approach 
also distinguishes private equity companies from 
hedge funds, which invest their capital in a much 
broader range of investment opportunities. In this 
paper, private equity is only understood to mean 
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the acquisition of companies already established in 
the market (“buyouts”). If, on the other hand, com-
panies are financed before, during or in the few 
years following their foundation, this is referred to 
as venture capital. In these cases there is a consid-
erably higher need for consulting, operational man-
agement and co-presence in the company, while 
buyout companies are more likely to be controlled 
by key financial figures, strategic decisions and the 
use of external consultants. 
Finally, the temporary holding period is charac-
teristic of the holding companies. In most cases, the 
private equity firms receive their capital through a 
fund paid into mainly by institutional investors. The 
deposited money is available to the investment com-
panies for an agreed period of time – usually about 
ten years. This forces the acquired companies to be 
resold within the time period. The financial inves-
tors receive a fee for managing the funds, and they 
also participate in the profits once a profit threshold 
has been reached. The remaining profit flows back 
to the fund investors. In Anglo-Saxon countries, the 
legal form of a limited partnership is often chosen for 
the construction of funds, so that the private equity 
shareholders manage the business as general part-
ners while the actual investors do not gain any insight 
into the business. Private equity funds are often lo-
cated in offshore financial centers. These offer low 
tax rates and low transparency requirements, mak-
ing it more difficult to track any profits to the players’ 
countries of origin. 
When a company is taken over, the acquiring com-
pany (e.g. a fund) often uses liabilities as an addition-
al source of finance. On the one hand, this increases 
the takeover volume of the PE-firm and usually also 
the profitability of the entire investment, so that the 
return on equity increases as long as it is higher than 
the interest paid on borrowed capital (“leverage ef-
fect”). On the other hand, in many cases the loan is 
passed on to the acquired company after the take-
over, so that the latter is automatically put under eco-
nomic pressure.
In addition to the transfer of loans, other purely fi-
nancial measures such as the raising and selling of 
hidden assets (e.g. real estate), cost-cutting strate-
gies, the closure of business areas with below-av-
erage returns and the division of the company into 
individual business areas with the aim of selling them 
has played a role in the private equity business. Such 
measures were, however, more characteristic of the 
corporate raider phase in the 1980s (Burrough and 
Helyar 1990). Since then, a much broader range 
of strategies has been established aimed at corpo-
rate growth, e.g. through internal reorganization, 
international expansion and innovation strategies 
(Hosskisson et al. 2013; Hammer et al. 2017; Söffge 
and Braun 2018; Bruinning 2019). 
There are conflicting theoretical approaches to the 
economic and social effects of private equity. Both 
supporters and critics, however, agree that there are 
significant changes in value creation and the situ-
ation of employees. In this paper, private equity is 
treated as an element of the financialization of the 
economy. Within the range of different concepts of 
financialization (cf. Epstein 2005; Krippner 2011; 
Faust and Kädtler 2019), this article mainly takes up 
political-economic concepts (Palley 2014; Hein et al. 
2015). Financialization is thus understood as a gain 
in importance of the financial actors vis-à-vis the 
real economic actors, whereby this shift is explained 
as a temporary, crisis-like solution to the contradic-
tions of the economic process. Following Fine (2013, 
p. 55), the growth of “fictitious capital” in particular 
is seen here as a qualitative change. A developed 
economy is essentially dependent on a functioning 
currency and credit system, whereby the amount of 
credit granted always remains in relation to the real 
economy. Only when the loan is made tradable as a 
claim to future interest payments does a qualitative 
change occur. Different assets go through this pro-
cess and the resulting claims to interest payments 
are made tradable. The credit-financed purchase and 
sale of companies (“leveraged buyouts”) developed 
by financial investors, i.e. the so-called private equity 
market, is one form of this financialization. The ac-
tivities of private equity are of particular importance, 
since this asset class often has a strong impact on 
the situation of companies or employees and since it 
now has the largest capital volume of the alternative 
asset classes (Preqin 2019).
3. Private equity and industrial 
relations
Since the 1980s, the private equity business mod-
el has been the subject of controversy in public and in 
the academic literature. A redistribution of values from 
other stakeholders of a company – e.g. employees, 
customers and suppliers – to the new owners was 
assumed at an early date (Lowenstein 1985, Shleifer 
and Summers 1988). Following the renewed boom 
in private equity in many industrialized countries be-
tween 2004 and 2008 (Kaplan and Strőmberg 2009), 
research into the consequences for employment, 
working conditions and wages increased (Wood and 
Wright 2009; Amess 2019). The effects on indus-
trial relations were examined primarily in case stud-
ies (cf. overview by Wilke et al. 2009: 135-140). For 
the United States and the United Kingdom, the main 
burden on trade union representatives has been de-
scribed (Appelbaum and Batt 2014; Clark 2009 and 
2011; rather optimistic: Bacon 2010). A comparative 
European study series revealed a small influence on 
industrial relations in Germany (Wilke et al. 2009: 
36, 49, 113; cf., 283; Gospel and Pendleton 2014: 
32). It was found that employee representatives, for 
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example, were involved in restructuring negotiations 
and that the institutions of co-determination had a 
balancing effect (Haves, Vitols and Wilke 2014, 165, 
172). Similar results were found in a case study by 
Lippert and Jürgens (2012) on the automotive supply 
industry. They observed a gradual change, erosion 
and undermining of the institutions of co-determina-
tion and concluded that co-determination was “strictly 
subordinated to shareholder value” (Lippert and Jür-
gens 2012: 238). 
Some reports with a trade union background – 
which also refer to only a few case studies – recog-
nize a clear dynamic of change (cf. Watt 2008). Here 
it is pointed out that private equity companies, as ac-
tivist owners, restrict the management’s authority to 
act, but refuse to accept the role of employer. The 
term “absent employers” (Krieger 2009: 108; cf. Ev-
ans and Habbard 2008:70) or “vanishing employer” 
(Watt 2008: 561) is used here. 
Overall, the state of research on the influence of 
private equity on industrial relations shows a whole 
spectrum of behavior by financial investors towards 
employee representatives. On the whole, there is a 
lack of studies that have a quantitative data basis and 
a sample of comparable cases.
4. Private equity investments in 
Germany 
Historically, the first PE-firms in the USA developed 
in the 1970s from investments on behalf of banks, 
insurance companies and private individuals. This 
was helped by the capital-market-oriented financial 
system, but also by capital-market-based pensions, 
which enabled pension funds to invest large sums in 
the new private equity asset class. In contrast, in Ger-
many the business model did not prevail until the end 
of the 1990s (Jowett and Jowett 2011: 52-75), when 
the financial sector in Germany was oriented towards 
the liberal market model (Jackson and Sorge 2012). 
An important impulse came from the tax exemption 
for profits from the sale of corporations that came into 
force at the beginning of 2002. This motivated nu-
merous corporations to divest less profitable parts of 
their businesses and brought the large US private eq-
uity firms to Germany. In addition, legal certainty was 
created for the taxation of profits from private equity 
funds. In the following years, numerous US and Brit-
ish PE-firm offices opened in Germany and until the 
global financial crisis in September 2008 the industry 
boomed (Bessler, Holler and Seim 2010: 527). After 
the downturn of the crisis, which also briefly affected 
the credit financing of takeovers, the buyout mar-
ket in Germany recovered (Faust and Kädtler 2018; 
Scheuplein 2019b).
In 2013, there were at least 156 private equity take-
overs of companies in Germany (Figure 1). This num-
ber continued to rise, especially in 2017 and 2018, 
and more than doubled to 316 acquisitions by 2018. A 
total of 1,358 takeovers of companies by private eq-
uity were identified in this period. The number of em-
ployees also increased initially, from 72.6 thousand 
in 2013 to 103.9 thousand in 2016 (Figure 2). Since 
then, however, the number of employees has de-
clined. In 2018, 81.5 thousand people were employed 
in the companies acquired in this year, bringing the 
total number of employees affected between 2013 
and 2018 to 545,000. This opposite trend is mainly 
due to the situation on the market for corporate con-
trol in Germany. The available capital of private equity 
companies has grown steadily in recent years. At the 
same time, many financing options are also avail-
able to strategic companies in the low-interest phase. 
Private equity companies have therefore discovered 
new sectors in which to invest their capital in recent 
years. In 2013/2014, almost 38% of takeovers took 
place in the core industrial sector (including mechani-
cal engineering, automotive, electrical engineering 
and chemicals). However, this share fell to around 
26% in 2017/18. At the same time, the service sector, 
in particular, gained significantly in takeovers, reach-
ing a share of 40% in 2018. The healthcare sector 
recorded the most gains, expanding its share of all 
takeovers from 5% to 27%. At the same time, their 
share of the workforce rose from 10% to 33%. The 
reason for this growth is the growing market for nurs-
ing homes, but also the new opportunities for private 
investors to acquire specialist practices (Scheuplein, 
Evans and Merkel 2019). In both areas, private equity 
companies have begun to build up large groups from 
many small nursing homes or doctor’s practices. This 
also explains why the number of takeovers has risen 
sharply while the number of employees has fallen.
Source: author’s calculations, based on Preqin, Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk 
and Majunke Deal News.
Figure 1.
Number of companies in Germany bought by private 
equity firms, 2013-2018
If one considers the type of private equity actor in 
the context of co-determination, then the large num-
ber of active investment companies must be taken into 
account. Although a group of around 50 companies 
can be identified that regularly carry out takeovers on 
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the German market, many companies are only oc-
casionally active on the market. In 2017, around 180 
financial investors participated in the approximately 
290 takeovers in Germany (Scheuplein 2019b: 14). 
At the same time, the majority of takeovers in recent 
years have been made by foreign investors, espe-
cially in terms of the volume of employment. Compa-
nies from the capital-market-oriented economies of 
the USA and Great Britain were dominant; however, 
financial investors from many coordinated economies 
such as France, the Netherlands and Sweden are also 
involved (ibid. 15). If, however, the financial investors 
are active in many national markets with only sporadic 
takeovers, then it is to be expected that they will only 
be able to engage to a limited extent in the institutional 
framework of a system of industrial relations.
5. Changes in corporate co-
determination 
Co-determination in Germany is based on two lev-
els. Firstly, employees in companies are represented 
at supervisory board level (Sandrock and du Plessis 
2017). Secondly, employees in companies with at 
least five employees can elect a works council, where-
by works councils have a wide range of rights related 
to information and participation (Page 2018). This sec-
tion deals with co-determination at company level. 
Co-determination at company level is based pri-
marily on the number of employees. Enterprises with 
domestic employment are subject to parity co-deter-
mination from a threshold of 2,000 employees, unless 
they are excluded due to their legal form. Companies 
with at least 500 employees must appoint their su-
pervisory bodies on a tripartite basis. (There are also 
special provisions for the steel and mining sectors). 
The establishment of these statutory bodies has al-
ways been a contested terrain (Dukes 2005; Con-
chon, Gold and Kluge 2010). The number of compa-
nies subject to equal co-determination in Germany 
has declined continuously since 2002, although a 
contrary trend was observed in 2016 (Ehrenstein 
2017). The downward trend was less attributable to 
an actual drop in domestic employment below the 
statutory limit of 2,000 employees than to strategies 
adopted by company management to circumvent 
co-determination requirements (Sick 2015, Bayer 
2015, Bayer and Hoffmann 2015). It is questionable, 
however, whether the trend will be reinforced by the 
involvement of financial investors. Typical corporate 
strategies of private equity companies, such as the 
spin-off and sale of business activities or their re-
location abroad, already suggest that the domestic 
employment volume will be reduced and the relevant 
minimum threshold of employees will thus apply. 
For this reason, the number of companies owned 
by private equity with more than 2,000 employees is 
documented here. This involved checking all compa-
nies that were taken over by a private equity firm in the 
period from 2006 to 2018 to see whether they were 
still significantly owned by financial investors in the 
first quarter of 2019. Only the workforce employed in 
Germany was included, as only their number is deci-
sive for the application of the Codetermination Act. In 
addition, the expertise of the Institute for Legal Fact 
Research at the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena 
was used to determine the status of co-determination 
for companies. A distinction was made between four 
categories (cf. Hoffmann 2016):
(1) The company is equally co-determined within the 
meaning of the Co-Determination Act 1976.
(2) The company is exempt from the provisions of 
the Co-Determination Act 1976, e.g. because it is 
a Tendenzunternehmen (tendentious enterprise). 
(3) Co-determination is avoided or (e.g. by using the 
legal form KGaA) only applied in a weakened 
form (avoidance of co-determination). (This form 
of avoidance can only be used if the change of le-
gal form is made before the employment thresh-
old is reached. If co-determination has already 
been introduced, it is also protected if the legal 
form is changed.)
(4) The statutory provisions of co-determination are not 
applied by management despite an abstract obliga-
tion to co-determine (ignoring of co-determination). 
It was possible to identify 44 companies owned by 
private equity that exceeded a domestic workforce of 
more than 2,000 employees (Figure 3). The number 
of employees in Germany in these companies was 
around 193,000. Of these, one company was initially 
free of co-determination as a Tendenzunternehmen. 
Parity co-determination was practiced in 18 compa-
nies. By contrast, in 21 companies (56%) the legal 
requirement was apparently ignored and in 4 compa-
nies co-determination was avoided as a result of the 
legal structure, e.g. by involving a holding company 
in the form of a Societas Europaea. 
Figure 2.
Employees in companies in Germany bought by 
private equity firms, 2013-2018
Source: author’s calculations, based on Preqin, Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk 
and Majunke Deal News.
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The automotive industry is the most important 
manufacturing industry in Germany and industrial 
relations are very strongly characterized by active 
workforces and the IG Metall trade union. In the auto-
motive supply industry in particular, there were many 
takeovers by private equity companies between 2004 
and 2008 (Scheuplein 2012). The author conducted 
a survey of works councils examining changes in the 
situation of employees and corporate governance in 
these companies (Scheuplein 2019a). The changes 
in the activities of works councils, which are de-
scribed below, were also discussed. 
The study was based on a sample of 121 com-
panies in the automotive supply industry that were 
owned by private equity companies between 2012 
and 2016. After subtracting the companies with only 
a minority shareholding through private equity, with 
a public holding company and companies that were 
known not to have a works council, the population 
consisted of 92 companies. The works councils of 36 
of these companies were interviewed. Larger com-
panies were preferred because they were more likely 
to have a works council. This is one of the reasons 
why the companies in the interview sample have a 
significantly higher number of employees (an aver-
age of 2,040 employees worldwide) than the average 
of all the companies taken over (995 employees) and 
also a higher turnover (237 million euros) than the 
average of the companies (132 million euros). The 
companies interviewed were located in all product 
segments of the automotive value chain, with most 
companies operating in the areas of powertrain 26%, 
interior (24%) and chassis (17%). Since many of the 
remaining companies have fewer than 100 employ-
ees and therefore probably no works council, the rep-
resentativeness is probably even higher.
More than half of the 36 companies for which an 
interview was conducted were sold several times to a 
financial investor. Of these, six companies (17%) ex-
perienced a threefold acquisition by a private equity 
company and a further three companies (8%) expe-
rienced a four-fold acquisition. The average holding 
period by a financial investor in the period up to the 
interview was just under four years. Because some 
companies have been acquired several times by fi-
nancial investors, the interviews contain statements 
concerning 69 takeovers. These acquisitions were 
made by 53 private equity firms.
The interviews with the works councils were con-
ducted on site – usually in the works council office – 
and each lasted 45 to 85 minutes. The questionnaire 
was semi-standardized, i.e. including both lists of que-
ries presenting strategic orientations and measures, 
and open questions for presentation and evaluation. 
The interviews are quoted in anonymous form, with the 
Arabic number indicating the company number and – 
in the case of several takeovers – the Latin number 
referring to the number of the takeover, e.g. [BR6-II].
These figures can be compared with the comprehen-
sive study by Bayer (2015) of all the cases of avoidance 
and ignoring of parity co-determination in Germany. He 
estimated the number of avoidance/ignoring cases at 
around 140 in 2015, with 635 companies having equal 
rights of co-determination (ibid. 19, 115). Depending on 
whether the private equity companies were excluded or 
not, this would have resulted in avoidance/ignoring in 
about 15-17% of the companies. On the other hand, 
avoidance/ignoring was identified in half of the private-
equity-managed companies, so that this type of owner 
avoids co-determination to a much greater extent.
6. Changes in the activities of 
the works council 
Works councils are a historically grown, institutional-
ized system of conflict resolution in Germany (Thelen 
1991; Müller-Jentsch 1995; Müller-Jentsch and Weit-
brecht 2003). A large proportion of works councils can 
exert influence on organizational decisions within the 
company beyond the rights they enjoy in accordance 
with legislation or collective agreements. Many works 
councils see themselves as conflict partners, and the 
management has clear contours as the addressee for 
the concerns of the employee representatives. This 
mutual recognition and knowledge formed the basis 
for trusting cooperation between the works council 
and management. Since the 1990s this system came 
under pressure. For example, the proportion of the 
German workforce represented by a works council at 
company level fell and membership of the trade unions 
declined (Behrens 2015). Nevertheless, the institutions 
of co-determination have remained largely stable and 
both works councils and employee representatives on 
supervisory boards are still able to shape the takeover 
of companies (Hassel 2014; Artus et al. 2016). 
Source: author’s presentation based on DAFNE/Bureau van Dijk, Deal 
News/Majunke Consulting, Preqin, own research and information from 
Thomas Hoffmann
Figure 3.
Companies with more than 2,000 employees 
owned by private equity and their employee volume 
according to the status of co-determination 
(in percent), ∑ 44 companies, Q I 2019
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Overall, the interviews with the works councils re-
vealed that the private equity companies implement 
extensive changes in the operational processes and 
corporate governance of the companies (Scheuplein 
2019c). This also has clear consequences for the 
activities of the works council. In the following, this 
will be examined in terms of effects on basic material 
equipment, access to information, quality of negotia-
tions and complexity of the activity.
The availability of resources for works council activi-
ties – e.g. rooms, office equipment, training costs – is 
legally guaranteed. Compliance with this requirement 
was described by the works councils as sound in the 
vast majority of private equity takeovers (77%). How-
ever, a relevant minority of seven takeovers (10%) saw 
problems, while another four takeovers (6%) found 
the works council’s equipment completely inadequate. 
This critical assessment was reflected in the interviews 
in a number of very harsh judgments, such as the lack 
of cost absorption for works council seminars [BR1], 
harassment related to access to office equipment 
[BR26-II] and the use of office space [BR12]. 
Providing information to employee representa-
tives is a prerequisite for their participation. In almost 
51% of all takeovers, the works councils were of the 
opinion that they had been correctly informed by the 
management. This was offset by 28% of takeovers 
where works councils found the information policy 
“problematic” and typically stated that they should 
have fought for essential information for their work 
[BR8-1, BR14-I, BR16-I, BR20-I, BR22-I]. In 14% of 
takeovers, “insufficient” information was reported be-
cause, for example, information on important opera-
tional changes was not provided [BR16-III].
The quality of the compromise reached with man-
agement was judged very similarly (Table I). While 
this was regarded as “correct” in 34 takeovers (49%), 
there were 24 takeovers (35%) with “problematic” 
conflict management. For six takeovers, this was as-
sessed as “insufficient” (9%). The reasons for this 
loss of partnership between employers and employ-
ees in co-determination have already been men-
tioned at several points: the limited time horizon of 
investors, the reduced decision-making authority of 
management and the refusal of financial investors 
to make contact. One works council describes this 
using the example of an interim manager who was 
willing to negotiate but was hindered by the private 
equity company and was therefore unable to comply 
with agreements made in this way [BR14-II]. 
A large number of unresolved conflicts were trans-
formed into a legal form by the actors. Numerous 
works councils reported on legal disputes concerning 
collective bargaining and personnel law issues, in par-
ticular the validity of collective bargaining agreements, 
Christmas bonuses, the use of temporary work and 
the classification of individual employees [BR1; BR7-
II; BR8; BR15; BR16-I, BR-17; BR20-I, BR30-I]. In or-
der to obtain information about important operational 
changes, legal action had to be threatened [BR16-III]. 
Legal expertise was also increasingly used by works 
councils in out-of-court dealings. 
The legal form of the dispute was to a large extent 
necessary “collateral damage”, which the corporate 
governance implemented by the financial investors 
entailed. In some cases, however, the legal dispute 
was also used as a deliberate attrition tactic by the 
company management, as a works council suspect-
ed: “We no longer got around to day-to-day business. 
We were put under constant pressure so that there 
was no longer any normal work of the works council” 
[BR1]. In another company, a works council reported 
that the employee representatives were constantly 
preoccupied by new proposals to put them on the 
defensive. Among other things, the work specifica-
tions were changed, which had to be examined in-
tensively in the committees and gave rise to legal 
disputes: “The company management were also 
happy to let this cost them something” [BR14-I]. A 
third works council summed up this practice as the 
loss of a social partnership culture of compromise: 
“One was always in a fighting position and had to 
fight for every employee” [BR6-I].
With three takeovers, the conflicts escalated to 
direct measures against the members of the works 
council [BR1; BR12; BR26-II]. In three other compa-
nies, the employee disputes with the financial inves-
tor led to the establishment of a works council [BR4; 
BR20-I, BR26-I]. 
Several works councils described this legaliza-
tion of the conflict partnership as a cultural violation 
[BR17]. The works councils underwent a painful and 
time-consuming learning process [BR26-II]. While the 
financial investor saw and experienced the use of le-
gal remedies as a legitimate means of confrontation, 
the works councils perceived these forms of conflict 
as new territory: “The investor side is easy with legal 
remedies. Accordingly, as a works council one must 
also be prepared to go to court or simply to generate 
legal costs. There is a lack of training here” [BR7-II].
All takeovers
Number In percent
(1) excellent 2 3
(2) correct 34 49
(3) problematic 24 35
(4) inadequate 6 9
not specified 3 4
Total 69 100
Source: author‘s survey ; N= 44 works councils with statements on 69 takeovers.
Table I.
Quality of the compromise reached with the 
management according to the works council
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This quote also refers to the increasing complex-
ity of works council activities, which should be dealt 
with by internal competence building and the use 
of external expertise. For the first takeover, almost 
half of the works councils stated that the demands 
placed on the works council had increased (Table II). 
For another third, the requirements had even “risen 
sharply”. By contrast, the level of requirements re-
mained constant for only two initial takeovers (6%) 
and fell for only three initial takeovers (8%). In the 
case of a second or repeated takeover, the major-
ity still reported (strongly) increasing requirements in 
works council work. 
Since works council activities have certainly be-
come more complex in the past two decades due to 
numerous challenges, it should be noted that the as-
sessments requested here explicitly referred to the 
financial investor type of owner. In addition to the in-
creasingly legal focus, the works councils also identi-
fied the need for knowledge of internal accounting as 
a reason for the increase in demands made on works 
councils. Accordingly, a number of works councils 
stated that they organized “training in controlling” 
[BR5-II; cf. also BR6-I and II; BR7-II; BR13-I; BR14-
I; BR17; BR18-I]. In individual cases, this expertise 
could also be used in operational reorganization, for 
example in the area of human resources projects 
[BR6-I; BR14-I], if management permitted this.
7. Conclusions
Research generally assesses the dynamics of 
change in industrial relations in Germany brought 
about by players in financial market capitalism as 
low. However, there is usually a lack of substantial 
analysis of the individual fields of activity of financial 
market players. This study focused exclusively on the 
activity of private equity and its impact on employ-
ment and industrial relations in Germany. 
Firstly, it was shown that a considerable num-
ber of employees are already affected by private 
equity takeovers. Thus, the number of employees 
in the companies taken over between 2013 and 
2018 amounted to approximately 545,000 persons 
(whereby some multiple takeovers have to be taken 
into account). If the average holding period of five 
to six years is considered (Scheuplein 2019b), then 
in 2018 about 1.5% of all persons subject to social 
insurance contributions in Germany were employed 
in a private equity company. It should be borne in 
mind that the temporary control of private equity 
ownership means that new companies are con-
stantly being created.
Secondly, the status of parity codetermination, 
which applies to companies with at least 2,000 do-
mestic employees, was analyzed. This showed that 
less than half of the private-equity-managed com-
panies have the co-determination that was actually 
expected, whereas this avoidance or ignoring of 
co-determination otherwise only seems to apply to 
one sixth of all affected companies in Germany. It 
should be noted that it was not possible to investi-
gate whether this move away from co-determination 
began before, during or after the takeover by private 
equity companies. Bayer (2015) has pointed out that 
in most cases companies not subject to co-determi-
nation know how to avoid future obligations, but that 
there are very few cases of active “escaping” from 
co-determination in Germany. This probably also ap-
plies to private equity companies.
Thirdly, results on changes in works council work 
in companies in the automotive supply industry were 
presented. The findings from the interviews with the 
works councils of 36 automotive suppliers indicate 
that in two thirds of all takeovers the activities of the 
works councils are shaped by the actions of this new 
type of owner. Four-fifths of the works councils re-
ported increased demands on the works council – al-
though only a small minority of the works councils 
viewed the quality of the information for the works 
council and the quality of the compromise reached 
with management critically. Numerous works coun-
Table II.
Requirements for works council work according to the works council’s statement
First investor Second investor All takeovers*
Number In percent Number In percent Number In percent
(1) strong increase 12 33 4 20 17 25
(2) increased 17 47 12 60 38 55
(3) decreased 3 8 0 0 4 6
(4) sharply decreased 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) constant 2 6 3 15 7 10
not specified 2 6 1 5 3 4
Total 36 100 20 100 69 100
*This figure also includes acquisitions by a third and fourth investor. Source: author’s survey.
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cils have also reported that industrial relations have 
become more legalized, both in terms of legal threats 
and of actual legal disputes.
All in all, the ownership type private equity showed 
increased and harder conflicts for employee repre-
sentatives. There are different types of financial in-
vestors, and learning processes with the system of 
industrial relations in Germany can also be observed. 
However, it is quite possible that with a further in-
crease in the takeover activities of private equity 
companies, the conflicts for employee representa-
tives outlined here will increase. 
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